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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council.* The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council.* The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2492nd MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 28 October 1983, at 11.00 a.m.

President: Mr. Abdullah SALAH (Jordan).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2492)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:
   (*a*) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
   (*b*) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
   (*c*) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

The meeting was called to order at 1.40 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:
(*a*) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
(*b*) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
(*c*) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the representative of Senegal to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sarré (Senegal) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the President of the Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite Mr. Mueshihange to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mueshihange took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with decisions taken at the 2481st to 2486th, 2488th and 2490th meetings, I invite the representatives of Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kenya, Kuwait, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico, Mozambique, Nigeria, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sahnoun (Algeria), Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Muñiz (Argentina), Mr. Legwaila (Botswana), Mr. Tsvetkov (Bulgaria), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Roa Kouri (Cuba), Mr. Kulawiec (Czechoslovakia), Mr. Ibrahim (Ethiopia), Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Somogyi (Hungary), Mr. Krishnan (India), Mr. Rajaie-Khorassani (Islamic Republic of Iran), Mr. Wabuge (Kenya), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mr. Treiki (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Muñoz Ledo (Mexico), Mr. Dos Santos (Mozambique), Mr. Fafowora (Nigeria), Mr. Arias Stella (Peru), Mr. Koroma (Sierra Leone), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Fonseka (Sri Lanka), Mr. Abdalla (Sudan), Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. Slim (Tunisia), Mr. Kirca (Turkey), Mr. Otunnu (Uganda), Mr. Rupia (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Martini

Urdaneta (Venezuela), Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Kunda (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The members of the Council have before them document S/16085/Rev.1, which contains the text of a revised draft resolution submitted by Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Togo, Zaire and Zimbabwe.

6. The first speaker is the representative of Uganda. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

7. Mr. OTUNNU (Uganda): Mr. President, I am grateful to you and to the other members of the Council for allowing my delegation to participate in this debate on the question of Namibia. May I, at the outset, extend to you the warm greetings and congratulations of the delegation of Uganda. During these very trying times for the international community, we are grateful to see a man of your great experience and skill at the helm of the Council.

8. To my brother, Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana, who preceded you in the presidency, I wish to pay a very special tribute. September was a very busy and difficult month for the Council and we followed with great admiration and pride the brilliant and most able leadership provided by Mr. Sinclair.

9. I take this opportunity as well to pay a warm tribute to the Secretary-General and his staff for their tireless efforts in favour of independence for Namibia. The report before the Council [*S/15943*] is sufficient testimony to those efforts.

10. Many times the delegation of Uganda has addressed the Council on the question of Namibia. Many times my delegation has recounted the chequered and tortured history of Namibia—that history of promises broken, of resolutions unimplemented and of trust betrayed. But today I do not intend to labour those issues.

11. Today the delegation of Uganda has asked to participate in this debate principally because of one issue, namely, this thing called "linkage". This concept, by which some people are seeking to link the independence of Namibia with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, is a recurring theme in the Secretary-General's report. It is plain from the report that virtually all issues contemplated under the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia have been resolved. Yet, concerning the implementation of the plan, the Secretary-General has made the observation that the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan." [*Ibid., para. 25.*]

12. There is no doubt that South Africa has embraced linkage as one more pretext for delaying the independence of Namibia. But the genesis of linkage is deeper and reaches beyond South Africa.

13. In an article in *The New York Times* of 15 July 1982, entitled "'Linkage' in Africa: U.S. attitude on Namibia and Cubans in Angola stirs gratitude in Pretoria", Joseph Lelyveld, then chief correspondent for *The New York Times* in southern Africa, related the genesis of linkage as follows:

> "The question of a Cuban withdrawal was never an issue in the seemingly interminable negotiations that South Africa held with five Western nations for four years, starting in 1977, over the future of the Territory.
>
> "It remained in the background, as far as the South Africans were concerned, until June of last year when William P. Clark, who was then Deputy Secretary of State visited here [Pretoria]
>
> ". . .
>
> "According to the version heard here, the South Africans were asked if they would feel any differently about a settlement under United Nations auspices if the United States undertook to guarantee that it would be accompanied by a Cuban withdrawal.
>
> "That, as the South Africans now relate the diplomatic history of the last 13 months, was the beginning of a meeting of minds between Pretoria and Washington that led South Africa to drop virtually every one of the procedural demands and quibbles that it had thrown in the face of the Carter Administration to forestall a settlement."

In the same article, Mr. Lelyveld quoted a South African Government official as having said: "This was something the Americans initiated, wanted and pursued."

14. In its editorial of 8 July 1982 entitled "Opportunity knocks in Namibia", *The New York Times* quoted Mr. Chester Crocker, the United States Assistant Secretary of State, as having stated, concerning linkage "The issues are now linked in the minds of policy makers". By introducing the concept of linkage in this way the United States has placed an embargo on the independence of Namibia.

15. The proponents of linkage have made a great issue of the presence of Cuban military personnel in Angola. In this connection, what are the facts on the ground? Let us consider them.

16. Neither Angolan nor Cuban troops have ever encroached on South African territory. On the contrary, it is South African troops which have continued to occupy the territory of Angola in Cunene Province since the invasion of August 1981.

17. No Angolan or Cuban troops have ever entered the territory of Namibia. On the contrary, it is South African troops which have continued the illegal occupation of Namibia since the General Assembly, by its resolution 2145 (XXI), terminated South Africa's Mandate over the Territory in 1966.

18. Neither Angolan nor Cuban troops have ever invaded any of the neighbouring States of the region. On the contrary, South Africa has continued to wage a relentless campaign of aggression and destabilization against the independent States in the region. South Africa provided a brutal reminder of this fact as recently as the morning of 17 October, when it attacked Maputo.

19. Geographically, Angola and South Africa do not even share a common border. It is South Africa which continues to use the territory of Namibia as a launching-pad for aggression and a training ground for subversives and mercenaries.

20. It is inconceivable that a few thousand Angolan and Cuban troops could pose a threat to South Africa, which is the foremost military Power in the region, with an annual military budget of approximately $US 3 billion and a military build-up which has now reached the level of over 200,000 regular troops and a total of 480,000 persons in a state of present or potential mobilization.

21. It is equally inconceivable, moreover, that a few thousand Cuban troops in Angola could in any way affect what has often been described as the "vital interests" of the United States.

22. In any case, both Cuba and Angola have publicly declared, most notably in the communiqué of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of both countries, issued on 4 February 1982, their intention to pull out Cuban troops provided that the security of Angola is assured.

23. It is clear from that survey of the facts that the situation on the ground in southern Africa does not in any way warrant this linkage.

24. We are aware, of course, of the long-standing divergence of views between the United States and Cuba. This is a regrettable situation. What we cannot understand, much less accept, is why the people of Namibia should be held hostage to that situation. We have searched in vain for a justification of this linkage.

25. Some delegations have expressed their concern about regional security in southern Africa as a whole. Who desires regional peace and security in southern Africa more than the independent States of the region, all of which are newly independent nations? These nations want peace, the peace that is necessary in order for them to concentrate on the urgent tasks of economic and social development. But what peace can there be in southern Africa while that region remains a free hunting-ground for South African troops? What peace can there be in southern Africa while South Africa remains in illegal occupation of the territory of Namibia, from where it conducts its campaign of aggression and destabilization against the neighbouring States?

26. In his report, the Secretary-General placed his finger squarely on this problem when he stated that:

> "A peaceful solution of the Namibian problem is also the key to a peaceful and co-operative future for all countries of the region." [*Ibid., para. 27.*]

Those who wish to see genuine regional peace and security in southern Africa must therefore begin by addressing themselves to the aggressor—the aggressor, who is the source of the problem—instead of pointing a false finger at the victims of aggression and occupation.

27. Never before have the people of Namibia come so close to the achievement of the goal of independence. In this connection, the Secretary-General has stated in his report:

> "These prolonged and intensive consultations have resulted, as far as UNTAG [the United Nations Transition Assistance Group] is concerned, in resolving virtually all the outstanding issues. In fact, we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)." [*Ibid., para. 24.*]

28. After 100 years of struggle in the wilderness of foreign occupation, a struggle in which many heroes and many innocent lives have been lost, the people of Namibia, under the leadership of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), have reached the threshold of the promised land—the land of independence. How cruel it is that at precisely this historic moment a new barrier—the barrier of linkage—has suddenly been erected to keep the people of Namibia from the promised land.

29. Once again the dream of the Namibian people has been deferred. It was the American poet, Langston Hughes, who reflected on this theme in his poem entitled "What happens to a dream deferred?" Because of the relevance of the message of Langston Hughes to the present discussion, I should like to quote his words:

> "What happens to a dream?
>
> Does it dry up like a raisin in the sun or fester like a sore and then run?
>
> Does it stink like rotten meat or crust and sugar over like a syrupy sweet?
>
> Maybe it just sags like a heavy load, or does it explode?"

30. What happens to the dream of the Namibian people is the responsibility of the Western contact group, which has failed to deliver on its promise of a settlement, in spite of all the concessions that have been made by SWAPO and the front-line States on the African side.

31. What happens to the dream of the Namibian people is the responsibility of the United States, which has unjustly placed an embargo on the independence of Namibia. But the United States is a great Power; it can lift this embargo without incurring any loss whatsoever.

32. What happens to the dream of the Namibian people is the responsibility of the Council, which is the custodian

of resolution 435 (1978). Since the Secretary-General's report makes it clear that virtually all outstanding issues which were contemplated under the United Nations plan for Namibia have now been resolved, the Council is duty-bound not only to reject the concept of linkage but also to take the necessary measures to begin the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) within a definite time-frame. If South Africa continues to obstruct this process then the Council should apply the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in order to compel compliance.

33. The dream of the Namibian people may be deferred but it cannot be extinguished, because it is a dream nurtured by a people's yearning for freedom and justice. It is a dream sanctioned by the norms of international law and supported by a global consensus of the international community. Once again we invite those which have alienated themselves from this consensus to return to the fold.

34. We in Uganda look forward with great confidence to the day, which cannot be far away, when Namibia will take a seat at this table as an independent and proud African nation. On that day there will be rejoicing throughout the length and breadth of the African continent. But, until then, the struggle must continue by all means necessary.

35. Mr. MASHINGAIDZE (Zimbabwe): I believe I speak for the Chairman of the Group of African States and the representative of the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement—although I have not had the opportunity to check with either of them—or at any rate express their sentiments when I say, as we move towards the end of our lengthy consideration of the situation in Namibia, which we began a week ago, that we owe everything to the friends, supporters and sympathizers who have made statements during the debate or shown great patience in sitting here throughout the long and sometimes very uncomfortable hours to show their solidarity with the people of Namibia—especially at this time when their own struggles, as well as the struggle of the people of Namibia, are becoming more and more difficult. So on behalf of those two gentlemen, the Chairman of the Group of African States and the representative of the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, I express our most sincere gratitude to you all.

36. As we all know, the current meetings of the Council were convened following the expeditious fulfilment by the Secretary-General of the mandate given him in resolution 532 (1983) to consult with the parties concerned, as provided for in the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia. We felt that at the end of the fulfilment of this mandate it was necessary to call on the Council to meet. The Secretary-General's report outlines in very clear terms the positions of the respective parties. While, as we had all expected, SWAPO, through its President, was prepared to tell the Secretary-General that it was ready to sign a cease-fire agreement with South Africa anywhere at any time, the *apartheid* régime of South Africa, on the other hand, continued to be characteristically unco-operative. To their credit, however, the South African leaders have also admitted—and the Secretary-General's report makes this very clear—that, as far as all the issues relevant to resolution 435 (1978) on the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia are concerned, they have absolutely no complaint. Again, in an honest way, they have told us that, in spite of that, they are not prepared to facilitate the independence of Namibia, and as reasons for this they cite what we have all characterized as issues that are foreign, alien and irrelevant to resolution 435 (1978). We have described those issues as unjustified, unfair, immoral and so on—using all the adjectives we can think of. It seems clear, therefore, that, do what we may, the South Africans are in no mood to move forward.

37. Those are the positions of the two parties. Therefore, we felt that the international community must be told of South Africa's position. We also felt that certain tendencies needed to be first explained and then formally rejected. We have tried to do just that in our statements. It is therefore, our hope that at the end of this debate those irrelevant issues which have been exposed will be known for what they are and that nobody will come back to the Council or go to any international forum to explain the lack of progress or the unwillingness to facilitate progress in terms of those issues. We have characterized them as linkage.

38. To achieve this objective in a formal way we have submitted to the Council a draft resolution. It aims at exposing, denouncing and condemning that linkage and those behind it and, finally, rejecting it once and for all. It is our hope that, after this series of meetings, nobody will ever in any way, directly or indirectly, try to bring the issue of linkage into the decolonization of Namibia equation.

39. The draft resolution before the Council has been worked out and couched in language that would reflect the international consensus that has been expressed here and in many other places that we need to move forward with the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and to reject anything that stands in the way of its implementation.

40. Draft resolution S/16085/Rev.1 tries in an honest way to meet the concerns of all members of the Council who in different ways have told the Council—and therefore themselves—that all the issues relevant to resolution 435 (1978) have been cleared up; people who have told the Council—and therefore themselves—that there should be nothing in the way of implementing resolution 435 (1978). All their concerns have been taken into account in the draft resolution.

41. The sponsors of this draft resolution—Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Togo, Zaire and Zimbabwe—had hoped that all 15 members of the Council would support it, because the document is intended to be an honest summary of our consensus position. If members look at it they will see that that is what we are trying to do.

42. However, it became apparent that some members found that they could not go along with everything we had said in the document. Their positions have been explained to us, and we have tried to reflect them and accommodate

them as far as possible. Even after that, however, it still seems difficult to accommodate everybody.

43. As a last resort we looked at draft resolution S/16085/Rev.1 again, and this is where the document that will be issued very soon as S/16085/Rev.2 enters the picture. I ask members to look at S/16085/Rev.1, operative paragraph 9, and here they will see our last-ditch effort to bring everyone on board. I should like now to introduce orally the revisions we have made at the last moment.

44. At the end of operative paragraph 9, the date "1 December 1983" should be changed to read "31 December 1983". If anyone says that that is not a concession—from one day to another 30 days—then I do not know what a concession is. The operative paragraph, as revised, should now read:

> "*Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution as soon as possible and not later than 31 December 1983."

45. Operative paragraph 10 has also been revised. The words "not later than 31 December 1983" should be replaced by the words "as soon as possible following the Secretary-General's report". The operative paragraph, as amended, should thus read as follows:

> "*Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter and to meet as soon as possible following the Secretary-General's report for the purpose of reviewing progress on the implementation of..."

The rest of the wording remains the same.

46. Until the very last minute before the President called this meeting to order our negotiating efforts were continuing. We have now reached the end of those efforts. We should like to thank all the members of the Council for taking such an understanding and sympathetic position and being so helpful in facilitating the negotiations. It is now up to the members of the Council, each delegation individually, to show us what their attitudes, their views and their positions are regarding the document before us. Once again we should like to express our sincere gratitude, and once again we wish to say that it is the intention of the sponsors of this draft resolution that when we come back to this chamber to discuss the question of Namibia there will no longer be any talk about linkage.

47. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I call on the representative of the United Kingdom, who wishes to make a statement before the voting.

48. Sir John THOMSON (United Kingdom): My remarks may sound slightly optimistic given the situation we are in, namely, a lunch hour without lunch and a resolution which, it appears, may not command a consensus as my delegation had profoundly hoped it would. We worked hard to try to make our hopes realities.

49. Although our efforts met with only partial success, it remains the object and hope of my delegation that the United Nations will have a success in relation to Namibia. We should like the United Nations plan for Namibia to be put into effect as quickly as possible. This would be good for the United Nations, for the people of Namibia and, in our opinion, for South Africa as well.

50. Accordingly, at the risk of being thought over-optimistic, I should like to stress the common thread which has run through our debate. It may be that my delegation is over-optimistic, but we have listened carefully not only to the rhetoric but also to the views expressed in the corridors and in private negotiations. We do not think the problem is so very difficult. It is a much easier problem than many of those which are on the permanent agenda of this Council. Therefore, let me stress some points which we trust all delegations support.

51. First, the Secretary-General has fulfilled his mandate under resolution 532 (1983) with great skill and determination. He has taken matters forward to the point where virtually all outstanding issues have been resolved. Collectively and individually, in support of the Secretary-General, and with his assistance, we must all continue to work for peaceful and early independence in Namibia.

52. Secondly, there is deep concern about the delay in securing Namibian independence. Implementation of the settlement plan is an urgent requirement.

53. Thirdly, the Council cannot accept that the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola should be a precondition for the implementation of a Namibian settlement. These are separate issues.

54. Fourthly, members of the Council can see no justification whatever for the presence of South African troops in Angola. South Africa should withdraw its forces at once.

55. Fifthly, despite its many other preoccupations, the Council must keep the question of Namibia under active review.

56. We all agree, I trust, that the fruits of seven years of persistent negotiations should not be cast aside. The progress made so far must not be undervalued. It is important that the Council's objective remains the peaceful implementation of an internationally accepted settlement in accordance with resolution 435 (1978).

57. My delegation has no difficulty in endorsing wholeheartedly these propositions. But we know that it is far simpler to state the objective than to achieve it. We agree with the assessment of the President of France that the task is difficult but possible. We can see the top of the hill, but there is a chasm between us and it. The contact group has been seeking to bridge that chasm. It is a slow process, but in the last few years we have added one span after another to the bridge. The Secretary-General has now added a further span or two. As a result, we are definitely nearer to the other side.

58. The bridge-building techniques which have brought us so close to our objective should not be discarded at this late stage. However, in building our bridge, the presence of foreign forces in Angola is, as I have said, a separate issue. Rightly, it is not dealt with in a draft resolution on Namibia. Our support for the draft resolution of course does not imply any weakening of our hope to see the departure of all foreign forces from Angola. To achieve this, the essential opening moves are: a military disengagement, a ceasefire, and a withdrawal of South African troops from Angola.

59. At the conclusion of his report [*S/15943*], the Secretary-General says that he is determined to continue his efforts to achieve early independence for Namibia. He deserves our sincere gratitude for his achievements thus far, and for his clear analysis, and deserves our active support in his further work. The Secretary-General calls on all concerned to make another major effort. My Government is ready to play its part in such an effort. We shall do so in pursuance of our membership of the contact group and in the spirit of the United Kingdom's very close ties of friendship and co-operation with the front-line States. The burden placed upon these countries is of great concern to us, and in our bilateral relations and our support for the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference, we shall continue to do all we can to assist.

60. This will undoubtedly be a theme of the bilateral discussions which the British Minister of State responsible for African Affairs, Mr. Malcolm Rifkind, will be undertaking in Zimbabwe and Angola when he visits those two countries and South Africa early next month. Likewise, we were honoured to welcome President Samora Machel of Mozambique to London on a State visit last week, and saddened that immediately beforehand his country was once again subjected to a raid by South African forces. My Government deplored this further serious violation of Mozambique's sovereignty, just as it has deplored all other acts of violence in the region.

61. I set out the British Government's position on 23 May [*2439th meeting*] during our last debate and I will not rehearse it now. But I will turn to the draft resolution in document S/16085/Rev.2. We are somewhat concerned at the burden which the Council is placing upon the Secretary-General by asking him to make a further report in a short period. My delegation has reservations about the reference in the fifth preambular paragraph to the use of Namibia as a springboard for destabilization. I must stress that we do not interpret the draft resolution as prejudging decisions to be taken by the Council in a later meeting.

62. In the spirit of moving forward to consensus, my Government is able to support the draft resolution in its present form because it endorses the approach followed by the Secretary-General, because it is consistent with our objective of securing the earliest possible implementation of resolution 435 (1978), and because we do not believe that Namibian independence should be delayed by matters outside the scope of resolution 435 (1978).

63. The United Kingdom does not believe that the problems of Southern Africa can or should be resolved by violence. We earnestly hope that all members of the Council will support the front-line States, the contact group and the parties directly concerned in the further major effort for peace to which the Secretary-General enjoins us.

64. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The members of the Council have now received draft resolution S/16085/Rev.2, which includes the oral revisions, introduced by the representative of Zimbabwe, that were made to draft resolution S/16085/Rev.1.

65. I shall now put to the vote draft resolution S/16085/Rev.2.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Against: None.

Abstaining: United States of America.

The draft resolution was adopted by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention [resolution 539 (1983)].

66. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I shall now call upon the members of the Council who wish to make a statement after the vote.

67. Mr. OLEANDROV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): The delegation of the Soviet Union voted for the draft resolution, which was prepared by the African countries and other non-aligned States that are members of the Council.

68. The Council's decision today on the problem of Namibia is a step in the right direction, since once again it condemns South Africa for its continued illegal occupation of Namibia and for its obstruction of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). The resolution also rejcts the demand of South Africa and the United States, to link Namibia's independence with extraneous issues, and calls upon South Africa to co-operate with the Secretary-General forthwith in order to facilitate the implementation of the United Nations plan on the independence of Namibia. The resolution also establishes a timetable for the presentation of the Secretary-General's report on the matter and provides that if necessary, measures shall be taken against South Africa under the Charter of the United Nations.

69. Thus the resolution strengthens the role of the United Nations in settling the Namibian question, which is a positive factor.

70. At the same time, our delegation must point out that, in the process of consultation, the original draft resolution was weakened. The reason is well known to everyone. As

in the past, during the 17 years that the United Nations has been struggling for the independence of Namibia, the United States and certain other Western delegations again appeared as the protectors and patrons of the racist régime in Pretoria, and resisted the inclusion in the draft resolution of a direct statement that sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter should be imposed against South Africa.

71. The overwhelming majority of countries whose representatives spoke in the Security Council supported the imposition of such sanctions if South Africa continued its sabotage of a Namibian settlement. However, the negative attitude shown by the United States and certain other Western countries virtually threatened a veto, and once more played into Pretoria's hands. There is nothing new in this. It has been confirmed once again that the United States and certain other Western friends of South Africa continue, under a smokescreen of pious hopes, promises and optimism, to protect the racist régime against international sanctions, and in this way are helping Pretoria to play for time and to block the granting of independence to Namibia. Whatever the representatives of those countries may have said in the Council, the facts and those countries' actual positions speak for themselves.

72. Mr. LICHENSTEIN (United States of America): My Government wholly supports the spirit of the resolution which has just been adopted. We share the ardent desire of the members of the Council—those who wish to contribute to a productive solution to the problem—to move Namibia towards independence without further delay within the framework of Council resolution 435 (1978). Many have worked hard and sincerely to that end, no one more effectively than the Secretary-General. My Government has worked hard and will continue to work to overcome obstacles that stand in the way of Namibian independence.

73. None the less, there are in resolution 539 (1983) certain elements that cause us concern. The resolution contains a number of references to past resolutions which the United States Government did not support.

74. Moreover, the time-frame provided by the resolution represents, in our judgement, a genuine effort in good faith to strike difficult and delicate balance. On the one hand, the Council must do nothing that would in any way encourage delay for the sake of delay. On the other hand, the same delicacy and the same difficulty counsel against unreasonable or unrealistic constraints on the negotiating flexibility required to overcome remaining obstacles to Namibian independence. My Government has some reservations on this score with regard to the language of resolution 539 (1983), although I reiterate that in our judgement it represents a laudable effort to strike the right balance.

75. Finally, we are disturbed by the resolution's implicit allusions to possible future action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. We regard such allusions as premature. Progress is being made in the negotiations aimed at securing the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). This progress, substantial progress, was reported by the Secretary-General in his report [*S/15943*].

76. My Government does not look forward to the possibility of failure; we look forward to—we are wholly committed to—ultimate success.

77. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): Mr. Lusaka, President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, wishes to make a statement. I now call on him to do so.

78. Mr. LUSAKA: Mr. President, I thank you once more for giving me the opportunity to speak. On behalf of the United Nations Council for Namibia, I should like to thank all delegations that joined us in the deliberations which are now coming to a close on the question of Namibia.

79. I should like also to thank you personally, Sir, for the efficient way in which you have guided our deliberations. These have been difficult times for you, and also for all the other members of the Security Council. Under your guidance, however, the Council has adopted yet another resolution on Namibia, resolution 539 (1983).

80. The United Nations Council for Namibia regards the resolution just adopted as an important one. The Security Council has joined the General Assembly in rejecting the linking of the independence of Namibia with any extraneous and irrelevant issues. It has declared that the independence of Namibia cannot be held hostage to the resolution of issues that are alien to its resolution 435 (1978).

81. Since South Africa has confirmed that all outstanding issues relevant to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) have been resolved, we must now start moving towards the implementation of the United Nations plan. SWAPO has already declared that it is prepared, in principle, to accept an electoral system based on either proportional representation or the single-member constituency system. Thus, South Africa must now communicate to the Secretary-General its choice of electoral system. It is imperative that the electoral system to be used for the elections of the Constituent Assembly should be determined prior to the adoption by the Security Council of the enabling resolution for the implementation of the United Nations plan.

82. We have spoken in this debate with one voice. All of us, including the representative of South Africa, have accepted that the United Nations plan on Namibia is the only basis for an internationally recognized settlement. As the Secretary-General has stated in his recent report, the continued failure to resolve the Namibian question has disastrous results for all the countries in the region and "it is in the interest of absolutely no one to have this situation continue" [*ibid., para. 27*]. We must therefore settle this problem now.

83. There are those among us who have joined with South Africa in urging us not to set any deadlines for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). How long can this situation be allowed to continue? How long can we let South Africa prevaricate while causing maximum damage to Namibia and to the independent African States in the region?

84. The time has come for the international community to point out to South Africa that the delay in resolving the Namibian question has also disastrous consequences for South Africa itself. Thus the resolution just adopted calls upon South Africa to co-operate with the Secretary-General forthwith in order to facilitate the immediate and unconditional implementation of the United Nations plan. The Council then requests the Secretary-General to report to it on the implementation of the resolution just adopted not later than 31 December 1983 for the purpose of reviewing progress in the implementation of the United Nations plan.

85. When one reflects on the developments surrounding the Namibian question since the adoption of Council resolution 435 (1978), one would conclude that all along South Africa has been playing for time to manufacture reasons for not complying with that resolution. Now that South Africa has no objection to any issues related to resolution 435 (1978), it is time to move as fast as possible before the fertile imagination of the South African racist régime comes up with other issues which they may directly link to resolution 435 (1978).

86. If South Africa refuses to co-operate with the Secretary-General, it must be made to realize that the inability to settle the Namibian question would spell disaster for itself. The Security Council would have to adopt at its next meeting on the Namibian question appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations.

87. As long as South Africa believes that it has nothing to lose by obstructing the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), we cannot expect it to comply. The racist régime in South Africa is completely amoral; it is a régime which cannot be expected to be moved by conscience. Only when it realizes what its losses would be for refusing to co-operate with the United Nations, could we expect it to adopt a realistic attitude towards the resolution of the Namibian problem.

88. If by 31 December 1983 South Africa has not co-operated with the Secretary-General, the Security Council would have the obligation to adopt appropriate measures under the Charter, thus demonstrating a higher standard of morality and justice. I should like to repeat here what I stated before the Council on 20 October, at the beginning of our current deliberations. I said then:

> "It is inconceivable that, for nearly two decades now, *apartheid* South Africa, whose social and political standards are indistinguishable from nazism, has been allowed to make a mockery of our shared sense of justice. Let us not allow ourselves to share in *apartheid* South Africa's burdensome guilt. Let us resolve to have the political will to save present as well as succeeding generations in southern Africa from the scourges of a catastrophic war. Let us resolve to reassert the authority, efficacy and moral superiority of the United Nations. And let us begin with Namibia, the saddest chapter of our shared history." [*2481st meeting, para. 91.*]

89. The United Nations is the conscience of the international community. It must be seen to lead and to act in the defence of morality and justice.

90. Let me conclude by reminding the Council of the words of the British philosopher, Edmund Burke, that "for evil to triumph it is enough that good men do nothing." We should not be condemned by history for doing nothing in the face of the evil that has been allowed, for too long, to cast its shadow of darkness over the people of Namibia.

91. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): Mr. Peter Mueshihange, Secretary for Foreign Relations of SWAPO, to whom the Council extended an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, wishes to make a statement. I call on him.

92. Mr. MUESHIHANGE: Mr. President, I have already congratulated you during my first intervention in this debate, but I should like once again to state how pleased we are at the way you have conducted the debate.

93. On behalf of my movement, SWAPO and the entire embattled but struggling people of Namibia, I wish to thank all the participants in this debate that has just been concluded.

94. Our determination to fight and defeat the enemy which has occupied our land for so long has once more been reinforced by the decision which has just been taken.

95. The people of Namibia, who yearn for the freedom and independence of their motherland, have for a long time now been looking to this body to remove the obstacles that have been put in their way. On behalf of my colleagues, I should like to assure the Council that we shall never relent until every inch of Namibia is liberated, including Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands. I must say that we, the people of Namibia, are determined to achieve that objective no matter how long it takes us. That is our duty. We only ask the Council to support our action in order to enable us to carry on our struggle.

96. I wish to conclude by thanking especially the members of the African Group and the Non-Aligned Movement in the Council for all their hard work in conducting consultations with the other members.

Organization of work

97. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): Before adjourning the meeting, I should like to announce that the Security Council will meet at 4 o'clock this afternoon to take up the item entitled, "The situation between Iran and Iraq".

98. Mr. MEESMAN (Netherlands): Mr. President, I am sorry to intervene at this late hour, but I desire some clarification. My understanding was that you would convene an informal meeting at about this time. How do you intend to go about it, since this morning's meeting has run rather

late? I should like to know what the programme will be this afternoon.

99. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I shall consult with my colleagues concerning the holding of informal consultations before the official meeting scheduled to take place.

The meeting rose at 3.05 p.m.

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THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2493rd MEETING: 31 OCTOBER 1983

NEW YORK

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council.* The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council.* The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2493rd MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 31 October 1983, at 11 a.m.

President: Mr. Abdullah SALAH (Jordan).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2493)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation between Iran and Iraq

The meeting was called to order at 11.50 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation between Iran and Iraq

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): Members of the Council have before them document S/16092, which contains the text of a draft resoluton submitted by Guyana, Togo and Zaire. I understand that the Council is prepared to take a vote on that draft resolution. Unless I hear an objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

2. I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

3. Mr. SHAH NAWAZ (Pakistan): The fratricidal conflict between Iran and Iraq, which has just entered its fourth year, has claimed the lives of thousands of innocent men, women and children, and inflicted savage punishment on scores of population centres on both sides. The unremitting hostilities spell disaster for the fragile economies of the two countries, and, if continued much longer, will mortgage their future to the vagaries of history's incalculable forces.

4. Pakistan has been profoundly moved by this tragic conflict. The pangs of anguish at the prolongation of this war are made more poignant for us, not only by our geographical proximity to the centre of hostilities, not only by the ties of tradition and history, but, especially, because the flow of our Islamic heritage and ideology can be traced directly to the fountains of culture and religion which cascaded in these two great countries many centuries ago. It is for this reason that the death of every soldier, injury to every citizen and the destruction of every home, village and city produces a sense of personal loss and agony in every citizen of Pakistan throughout the length and breadth of the country.

5. The deep anguish of the people of Pakistan has been reflected in the continuous efforts which the President of Pakistan has made, both at the personal level and as a member of the Islamic Peace Committee, to bring about a resolution of the conflict. Neither the passage of time nor the lack of progress in our peace efforts so far has made us give up hope or abandon our quest for conciliation and peace between the two Islamic countries. We remain as fervently committed today as we were at the beginning of the conflict to seeking an end to this tragedy. We are encouraged by the trust and confidence which the two countries have reposed in us to persevere in our search for peace undaunted by the difficulties in our path.

6. Since the beginning of the war, the Security Council, the Islamic Peace Committee, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and individual peacemakers have been making efforts to bring about an end to this tragic conflict. None of these initiatives has been attended by success.

7. The Council first considered the Iran-Iraq conflict in late September 1980 [*2247th meeting*], when a presidential statement [*S/14190*] was followed by the adoption of a resolution [*resolution 479 (1980)*] calling upon the two parties to observe a cease-fire and settle their dispute through peaceful means. Since then, the Council has adopted two resolutions [*resolutions 514 (1982) and 522 (1982)*] and three presidential statements [*S/14244, S/15296 and S/15616*]. Simultaneously, mediation efforts have been made by Prime Minister Olof Palme of Sweden on behalf of the Secretary-General.

8. The magnitude of the issues involved in the conflict has, however, dwarfed the efforts reflected in the Council resolutions and the appeals in the presidential statements. One of the major reasons for the failure of the international bodies, in particular the Council, to take effective measures to bring about a cease-fire and terminate this tragic conflict has been Iran's perception of a lack of proper understanding of its point of view by the Council. The inability of the Council adequately to respond to Iran's concerns and misgivings, particularly during the early stages of the conflict, has caused Iran to form a somewhat impetuous judgement about the Council's capacity to play an effective role as a peacemaker.

9. While the capacity of the Council to influence the course of events in the Iran-Iraq conflict thus remains impaired, the fratricidal war continues not only to take a heavy toll of life and property on both sides, but to approach a flashpoint which could spark off a wider conflagration, with far-reaching consequences for world peace and security. In such an eventuality, the belligerent countries themselves and their neighbours in the region would be the greatest sufferers and the biggest losers.

10. When the Council addressed itself once again to this issue in its current session, it was our hope that a serious attempt would be made to evolve a resolution that would engage both parties in a process combining the virtue of an immediate containment of hostilities with the prospect of a comprehensive peace settlement to follow. The alternative was, as in the past, to adopt a resolution which the Council, in its judgement, deemed fair and necessary, even if it left one party to the conflict as disenchanted and aggrieved as ever. Resolutions of the latter category already exist, and the addition of another of that kind would hardly have a meaningful impact on the war.

11. In order to contain and bring to an end this three-year-old conflict, what is required above all is to promote a peace process in which both the parties become fully engaged. Given the great objective before us, that of restoring peace and tranquillity in a most sensitive area of the world, we need to summon all our resources of patience and courage to help us remain fully committed to this noble goal.

12. We regret the loss of an opportunity during our informal consultations when a sustained effort might have succeeded in getting the two parties involved in the process of consultations with the promise of a meaningful outcome. Instead of devoting more time to exhaustive consultations, we are hastening to adopt a document which is not fully matured and which lacks consensus. It is not likely to serve the objective we have in view. We must now wait for another propitious combination of circumstances for a renewed effort to activate a peace process.

13. It is as much for those reasons as for our concern for the preservation of Pakistan's impartial role as a member of the Islamic Peace Committee that we shall abstain from voting on the draft resolution which, nevertheless, has many positive features, such as the call for a cessation of hostilities, the emphasis on the continuing role of the Secretary-General, the affirmation of the right of free navigation in international waters in the region of the Persian Gulf, the call addressed to the belligerents to respect the integrity of other littoral States and the emphasis on the need for all States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to further escalation and widening of the conflict.

14. The prolongation of the Iran-Iraq conflict in a region which harbours so many other combustible issues exposes it to the danger of great-Power intervention. The ever-present threat of great-Power confrontation in that vital region has never been so imminent, nor the ability of the United Nations to avert a catastrophe so impaired as at present. It is, therefore, imperative for the States of the region, in particular for Iran and Iraq themselves, to demonstrate sensitivity to this grave situation, and hasten to make peace in the interest of their own survival and independence.

15. Mr. GAUCI (Malta): As we have stated on so many occasions and in every forum open to us, the Maltese Government views with great concern the outbreak of hostilities between Iraq and Iran, both countries staunch friends of Malta. On every single day, indeed practically at every single hour since the unfortunate outbreak of hostilities, it has been Malta's constant endeavour to encourage reconciliation between the two parties through a cease-fire and negotiations. We were therefore encouraged that both sides responded with detailed and written observations to the working paper which had been the focus of concentrated attention in the Council in the course of the informal consultations over the past two weeks or so. We have stated our position in the informal consultations and we wish to confirm our reasoned position publicly today.

16. As members no doubt would be aware, my delegation took the objective stand that the main concern of the Council at this stage should be to build on the initial responses received and to undertake urgent and energetic efforts to bring the two sides together in an open attempt to initiate, through the good offices of the Council, a constructive and, we would hope, positive dialogue. We believe that this approach would offer better possibilities than the mere passage of a draft resolution, even though it would undoubtedly be more time consuming. Since we know that one side has not considered that it has been given a reasonable hearing and sufficient consultation by the Council during its current consideration, we naturally favoured a prolongation of the exercise under way in the Council. Others, unfortunately, felt otherwise and pressed for a vote. It the vote will help reconciliation between the parties and bring about a cessation of hostilities, nothing would give my country greater pleasure. But for the reasons stated, we have misgivings and therefore, while not opposing the draft resolution, my delegation will have to abstain in the voting on it.

17. We remain open, within our modest means, to exercise renewed efforts to bring about the cherished hope of reconciliation and the cessation of the conflict between Iraq and Iran. This we pledge to both parties and to the Council. We hope that the time will soon come to bring about constructive negotiations with the continued and dedicated assistance of the Secretary-General.

18. Mr. TINOCO FONSECA (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): We should like to speak before the draft resolution on the situation between Iran and Iraq, sponsored by Guyana, Togo and Zaire [*S/16092*], is put to the vote.

19. Notwithstanding the efforts to reconcile the various views of the members of the Council, it has not been possible to produce a consensus document. We would have preferred that, in this matter of such special importance and delicacy, the actions of the Council be guided by a

conciliatory approach which would include the stand taken by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on this question. For various reasons it has not been possible for that approach, the only one that, in our opinion, can truly contribute to a solution of the problem, to prevail. We have friendly relations with Iran and Iraq, sister countries that are involved in a fratricidal and senseless struggle. Our friendship with both countries by virtue of the principles of non-alignment lead us to believe that there are better methods for dealing with this delicate and complex situation.

20. The draft resolution before us does not provide them. That is why we very much doubt that it will achieve the desired results. As we said in the informal consultations, should the draft resolution reflect the views of the majority of the members of the Council, we cannot object to the Council taking such action as it deems necessary in this situation. But we cannot endorse by an affirmative vote a decision which lacks any guarantee of effectiveness and even casts doubt on the ability of the parties to the controversy to bring about a relaxation of tension.

21. That is why we shall have to abstain in the voting on the draft resolution.

22. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by Guyana, Togo and Zaire [*ibid.*,].

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Netherlands, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Malta, Nicaragua, Pakistan.

The draft resolution was adopted by 12 votes to none, with 3 abstentions [resolution 540 (1983)].

23. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I shall now call on members of the Council wishing to make statements after the voting.

24. Mr. MEESMAN (Netherlands): It is on the Security Council that the Members of the United Nations have conferred the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Confronted with acts of aggression or a breach of the peace, it is our collective duty to make constructive and objective recommendations and, if necessary, to take collective measures in order to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, the adjustment or settlement of the conflict.

25. The cruel war between Iran and Iraq has now already lasted for more than three years. More than eight months have elapsed since the Council issued its last presidential statement on the conflict [*S/15616*], which now threatens to escalate even further into the region of the Gulf. Surely, if it is to live up to its special responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations, the Council simply cannot remain silent.

26. We should, however, recognize that past decisions of the Council have failed to bring about conditions leading to a peaceful settlement of the conflict in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.

27. If we are to achieve favourable conditions leading to an end of this war it is, in our opinion, essential for this Council not only to be as objective and balanced as possible in its assessment of the conflict but also to secure the agreement of both parties to co-operate with the decisions of the Council. It was with these important objectives in mind that the Netherlands delegation took an active part in the consultations which led to the draft resolution submitted by Guyana, Togo and Zaire. Because we are not dissatisfied with the result, the Netherlands voted in favour of the draft resolution.

28. However, as on previous occasions when the Council dealt with the situation between Iran and Iraq, one of the problems facing the Council remained how to secure the compliance of both parties with a resolution. I repeat that, for Council decisions to have any real impact on this serious and bitter conflict, a certain measure of co-operation on the part of both parties is indispensable. We seem to have been nearer to this important objective than on any previous occasion and we, for our part, therefore, regret that it has not been possible to explore the possibilities which might have presented themselves to the very end.

29. In conclusion, we wish to express the hope that this new resolution will serve as a first step to a more meaningful involvement of the United Nations in the search for a comprehensive, just and honourable settlement of the conflict in all its aspects that is acceptable to both sides. The important role which the Secretary-General could play to this end is underlined in paragraph 1 of the resolution, which requests him to continue his mediation efforts. If the belligerents were to heed the calls for the immediate cessation of all military operations against civilian targets and for the ending of all hostilities in the region of the Gulf, as expressed in paragraphs 2, 3 and 5, this could help to bring about the more favourable conditions required to end this bitter war by peaceful means. Last, but not least, we whole-heartedly agree with the call reiterated in paragraph 6 for all other States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which might lead to a further escalation and widening of the conflict.

30. Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Today's meeting of the Council reflects the profound concern of the overwhelming majority of Members of the Organization in connection with the continuing armed conflict between Iran and Iraq. This concern is whole-heartedly shared by the Soviet Union, which cannot fail to take an interest in eliminating dangerous hotbeds of tension in regions which are in the immediate vicinity of its frontiers.

31. Ever since this conflict broke out, the Soviet Union has consistently taken a clear and definite position—which is that it is essential to bring about an early cessation of military actions between the parties and the political settlement of the controversial issues by peaceful means. On the basis of this position of principle, and guided by its desire to promote efforts to end the tragic war between Iran and Iraq, the Soviet Union supported the previous unanimous decisions of the Security Council on this subject. Our country also expressed its support for the mediation mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and other constructive international efforts aimed at moving the conflict on to the path of a political settlement.

32. The Soviet Union has consistently and categorically opposed, and continues to oppose, any attempts on the part of external forces to exploit the Iran-Iraq conflict for intervention in the internal affairs of States in that area. It is the sovereign right of those countries and peoples to provide for their own security and to dispose freely of their own natural resources. Any armed intervention in this area, no matter what the pretext—including that of ensuring freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf—is absolutely inadmissible. It must be absolutely clear to everyone that such intervention could have extremly dangerous consequences for the fate of peace in this region and throughout the world.

33. On the basis of these considerations, the Soviet delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution [*S/16092*].

34. Mr. LING Qing (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation has all along maintained that the war between Iran and Iraq should be settled by peaceful means. The Chinese delegation further holds that, in the present circumstances, the question of how to bring about the participation of both sides in the process of peaceful negotiations is an extremely important one. The Council should give serious consideration to this point when it decides to take action.

35. The draft resolution that has just been put to the vote, in which the Council calls for a cease-fire and requests the Secretary-General to continue with his mediation efforts and other positive factors, is consistent with China's position that the conflict between the two sides should be settled by peaceful means.

36. For this reason, the Chinese delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution.

37. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The Council has concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

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